Posted on

On Cultural Understanding

In this modern world, people more than ever are brought into contact with other people across the globe. Internet allows us to engage in real time with persons from very different backgrounds. Migration and travel bring us face to face with very diverse groups of people. At a simple level, we are all able to partake of such conversations in a civil and sensible way, but often there is arguably a barrier to some sort of deeper understanding where the views and values of the other come from. Often, we do not know what to expect from or how to understand others. This is a dimension of human interaction that is often overlooked. Often we approach the other within the context of our own ways of thinking. Most of the time, that can work well. A deeper understanding, however, offers the possibility of gaining a better insight -however imperfect- into the aims, intentions and range of choices of others. If anything, it makes the thoughts and behaviour of the other more predictable and understandable. At best, it shows respect for people from a different background. All human cultures are based on values that are positive for those that are part of them.

Human beings interact in societies in which they seek to understand their world and achieve solutions to the problems which threaten their survival and improve living conditions. This involves not just such basic needs such as food, security and procreation, but also mental health and the reduction of risk in daily life. It also concerns ways of developing societies and communities beyond such basic needs. A look around the world serves to show that humans have found many, vastly differing solutions to these needs. A common factor seems to be that all human societies have found their solutions by developing world views or religions that served to describe the world they lived in and justify the way human communities have been structured and function. As a result, communities have developed the ideas, linguistic concepts and social values and rules that make behaviour within the community both conform to its world view or religion and (mostly) ensure it is predictable. The kind of world view or religion these communities have evolved have had important consequences for the way the members of different societies have been socialised, interact and, more on an individual level, the way in which they have developed their personalities.

It is often overlooked that there are important emotional effects at play here. A healthy personality is dependent on mental safety and a broad affirmation by others. We all know that personal behaviour has to chime with the group we find ourselves in. It is perhaps not commonly known, however, that most people hate to have to think in order to act or solve a problem. Most of the time human beings act and think based on set patterns. In fact, a given value system serves to reduce problem solving by placing it within an internalised and well-rehearsed system of culture and language. To be transposed to a different community raises basic problem solving questions that involve not just cultural and linguistic problems, but also deeper personality issues and fundamental ways of dealing with other persons. In a different setting, we can feel badly out of place and do not know what to expect. This is as valid for personal contacts as it is for international relations.

Basic to this approach is the realisation that human beings relate to and communicate with the world around them within the (often implicit) framework of their worldview, behavioural patterns and values. There is no self-evident way of interacting with other humans or describing the world. In a way, you could say, other persons are complete strangers and empirical reality is metaphysical to us. We need to conceptualise both social and physical reality to be able to deal with them. We need a certain amount of shared social knowledge to interact in a meaningful way. This is as true of our dealings with our own communities as of our approach to other communities and the physical world around us. Everyday language, behavioural rules, logic and mathematics are human inventions. Language and values have been developed to be able to interact in society. Mathematics serves to quantify physical reality and has proved a basis for modern science. There is no reason why, just like language, there could be a different kind of mathematics. In the last instance, we are all reduced to a mental awareness of reality and the socialised tools to deal with it.

There is also no reason why humans cannot learn to be proficient in other languages, cultures or forms of mathematics. Opponents of the kind of the cultural relativity that I describe here, are quick to point out it is a form of immorality or racism. Such accusations are ludicrous. All human beings have similar brains and the same ability to learn. In that sense, there is no such thing as race. It is a fact, that moralities differ among societies. Culture is acquired, not innate. As pointed out above, however, humans do undergo a socialisation process in which their personalities are formed. Different cultures spawn different kinds of personalities or self-identities. In all of this, individual character always remains a factor. As an individual grows older, socialisation involves making choices about the make-up of one’s personality, that can make it difficult to learn to be proficient in a culture that is not one’s own. In fact, to learn as an adult to function in another culture may bring on what is called a culture shock: a adaptation of one’s personality to understand and function in a newly learnt culture. As with other forms of knowledge involving an important emotional component, some will be better at achieving this than others.

So, how does one acquire the necessary knowledge of a different culture? The most simple answer is to undergo some form of socialisation in that culture. It is first of all learning, thinking through and applying the social rules, that govern human interaction in that culture. A second step is to acquire a knowledge of the legitimation for those social rules. These are the stories that make up the world view and intellectual universe of a culture. The aim is to chime in as much as possible with the other group. Convinced as you are of the value of your own social rules, you will probably not like much of what you encounter, but that is irrelevant. The aim is to gain an insight into how people in that culture interact when you aren’t there. Cultural relativism doesn’t mean that you discard your own values, it merely helps you to understand those of others. And any culture offers a wide range of possible views. Cultures do not determine opinions and views, but merely structure the way they are formulated. This short essay in Chinese or Swahili would probably be written in quite a different way, but convey the same message.

Basic to a socialisation in another culture is learning its language. Languages conceptualise reality in different ways. In English, a horse refers directly to the physical animal. In Chinese, the same word refers to the category of horses, which needs to be individualised through an additional word. This is a subtle, but important mental difference. Words in different languages describing a socially pleasant encounter, such as cosy in English, gemütlich in German, and gezellig in Dutch can’t really be translated accurately. Something is always “lost in translation”. These are closely related, Germanic languages. Imagine the differences in other languages and cultures. Rather than compare, it makes more sense to understand such words on the basis of the social culture concerned. Individual languages, after all, form conceptual universes in which individual words make sense in relation to each other. Importantly, languages also determine how we approach such basic aspects of reality as time and space. Not every society has a nine to five mentality. There is a vocabulary that structures society and the interaction in it too, so we know what to expect from each other in given social settings. These are basic assumptions that affect the way we act.

Language, however, isn’t determinative of culture. English is a good example of a language, that is used in different cultures. Hardly anyone will disagree with me that English, American, Jamaican, Kenyan, and Indian societies aren’t culturally the same. Words may acquire different meanings in different cultural settings. Language is one instrument amongst others to communicate. As such, it is a tool that may be adapted to social and cultural needs. Different cultures may prioritise different needs. It may come as a surprise to many Americans, but money is certainly not the most important thing on the minds of most other people on the face of this earth. Power, status, loyalty, faith or mere curiosity are among other things that are extremely important to many too. More down to earth, happiness, safety, a healthy and successful family, jobs, and holidays are prominent values.

Clearly, culture is a different dimension of our awareness. This brings me to cultural values proper. People partake of groups and societies for different ends. In most of the world, religion, faith or ideology (all Western terms!) is extremely important. So is belonging to a group. These matters provide a structure to reality and fashion behaviour after it. You don’t have to be a Buddhist to understand how Buddhism approaches reality. You merely have to be aware of the fact that people actually believe that is the truth and therefore act after it. A world view provides a framework that is often open to widely diverging cultures. As Clifford Geertz has shown, the Islam of Indonesia is very different from the one in Morocco. Present-day libertarians in the West refer to a natural law of markets and competition without any state involvement. That too is a world view. Arguably, being a fan of a football club can offer a sense of belonging too.

Culture can also be subdivided into subcultures. Local communities, professions, and informal groupings can develop their own codes of behaviour and ideas. Different groups with a culture can be mapped and analysed to show debates with cultures and societies.

The thing is, faiths, religions, and world views, but also social codes, can be described and internalised. With knowledge of such intellectual thought systems, behaviour can be made more predictable. From politics to economics and social codes, these systems structure societies and behaviour. They determine not only what rules are, but how they are viewed. Is a rule hard and fast or is it more fluid? Is it explicit or implicit? Is it to be followed or precisely broken? We often live in multiple layers, where we say one thing and do something else. People in any given culture or society know that, some better than others. Some societies, such as the Japanese, have extremely rigid social rules, others are more flexible. Often, a world view is implicit or important at different levels.

Understanding each other in this global village is increasingly important. Cultural understanding sounds difficult, but can be acquired to different degrees. Awareness of cultural differences calls for a form of empathy that will make the actions of major players on earth more understandable and predictable. It can ease communication between individuals in many different social settings. In a world of rapid change, migration, travel, trade, and war it will facilitate meaningful interaction and accommodation between people. Culture, as a form of communication within groups, can be described and learned. We step out of the narrow confines of our own local debates and grow closer to one another on a larger scale. International peace, climate change, and the future of our children require it, but in order to do so, we have to take the emotional step out of our cultural bubbles.

Posted on

The Coming Collapse of Russia

The war against Ukraine is not going well for Russia. After its initial attack on 24 February 2022, Russia has had to retreat its troops from the north of Ukraine. By all accounts, the Russian army has suffered heavy losses in manpower and material. Reportedly more than a quarter of the 120 Battalion Tactical Groups, it initially fielded, have been rendered “combat ineffective”. The war continues in the east and the south of Ukraine, but at best progress there has been slow. Amazingly, the city of Mariupol has still not fully been taken. One belated change has been to put all Russian troops under a single commander. However, instead of pausing to recover, replenish, and regroup, the Russian army seems to be drip-feeding its troops to the Ukrainian army. Both the Russian air force and navy haven’t particularly excelled either.

There is now a lively debate in the West and elsewhere about what went wrong and what options remain for Russia. There is quite a long list of items that can readily be made by the experts. From bad leadership, corruption, faulty planning, and a failure to heed even the most basic principles of modern warfare to problems in maintenance, logistics, training, command structures, communications, concerted action, and tactical fighting. Perhaps the most damning verdict is that the Russian army has seemed unable to learn from its mistakes, past and present. The suggestion is that its performance, that to many is reminiscent of World War 2 tactics, will not improve. In fact, one is even reminded of some of the more disastrous military campaigns of czarist times. Russia’s famed intelligence services have not faired any better.

If the initial aim of the campaign seems to have been to turn Ukraine into a puppet state, much like Belarus, or to simply annex it to Russia, the question remains what Russia’s present, clearly more moderate, aims are. At best, the Russian army could occupy and annex the Donbas and parts of southern Ukraine. A more ambitious scenario could see it advance to take territory up to the Dniepr River and a southern corridor up to Transdniestria. By taking the city of Odesa, Russia would be able to strangle much of Ukraine’s economy and menace Moldova too. It would form a fitting conclusion to Russia’s stated aim of Ukrainian denazification, that is Putin-speak for punishing Ukraine for turning its back on Russia.

However, the Russian losses are reportedly so high that one may seriously wonder whether Russia will be able to sustain its attack. Of an army of some 190,000 soldiers that launched the invasion on 24 February, an estimated 15 to 20 thousand have already been killed. Allowing for a ratio of one killed to two wounded, this would mean that anywhere between 45,000 and 60,000 soldiers of a total of 190,000 have been eliminated –somewhere between a quarter and a third. That is a staggering amount, rendered all the more significant if one realises that an army is made up of front soldiers and support. Many of Russia’s best front soldiers have been killed. Reports speak of up to ten generals as well. Numerically, Russia may be able to replenish its forces, but it is questionable whether it will be able to replace them with men who possess the knowledge and skills required of modern warfare. Questions of Russia’s own more general security will also surface.

It is reasonable to question whether even this more limited scenario is at Russia’s grasp. So far, the Ukrainian defences have held up quite well. As WW2 has made clear, quick “Blitzkrieg” wars are basically won by military means. Slower wars are decided by economic clout. It was never in much doubt that the Allies would win WW2, just how long it would take. With the West supporting Ukraine, something similar may be at play now. Russia had about two or three weeks to defeat Ukraine and present the rest of the world with a fait accompli. Now this chance has been missed, it will have to face a Ukraine that is supported by the united economic might of the West. It may call up more soldiers, but it cannot undo the loss of surprise and skills. The slow pace of war in the East does not bode well for Russia. Economic clout will now be brought into full play.

More generally, it should not be forgotten, that Russia’s GDP is about the same as that of Spain. Compared to the four other permanent members of the UN’s Security Council, it is an economic gnome. It’s economy is also one-sided. It is heavily dependent on the export of raw materials from its vast territory -especially oil and gas, and the production of weapons. Both will be hard hit by the unprecedented sanctions that have been imposed by the West. Without Western revenues in foreign currencies of oil and gas, Russia will be cash-strapped. Moreover, many of Russia’s best weapons systems contain hi-tech Western components that it will not be able to replace. Traditionally, much of Russia’s R&D has been acquired legally or illegally from the West too. Its loss of scientific contacts and the expulsion of spooks will leave Russia largely without the means to modernise its army. Russia’s broader economy has also been severely hit by Western sanctions. Much of Russian society is in for a fall in living standards and an ongoing brain drain as well.

Russian society, in fact, is weak. Outside of the larger cities, social cohesion seems largely absent. There is barely a real middle class. Unlike the West, Russian culture does not know of a contract theory or a system of rights as the basis of society. Wage labour is considered a form of exploitation. Russia’s problem is that it is a very large, sparsely inhabited, and disunited country with many different ethnicities. For years now, the country has experienced a reduction in population and reportedly alcohol and drugs abuse are widespread. What keeps the country together is the state. It is the state that provides many jobs to poor and uneducated young people in the countryside. Its sprawling security services and army enlist many young men. At the same time, however, Russia’s political system impedes its economic development. Although private enterprise now exists, any business exceeding a certain size, will be co-opted into the state system or suppressed. Recently, president Putin has been clamping down on its small, independent civil society, such as the press and NGOs.

In many ways, Russia still has many of the characteristics of its czarist and Soviet past. Power is concentrated in the hands of one man, who commands fealty from his followers. Under him, there are networks of people who understand the informal rules, or ponyatiya, that will guarantee their positions and income. Within these networks, loyalty is primarily directed not at the supreme leader, but at the person most directly in a leadership role. A large part of the income of such networks is assured through a system of institutionalised corruption that thrives off society and the immense natural resources of the country. The bigger and more powerful the network, the bigger the share of the social spoils. All state agencies partake of these practices and there is incessant bickering between networks. Social control is ensured by a mix of fear, suppression, disinformation and propaganda. Russian society is very cynical and dishonest by Western standards. Even the law is so opaque and contradictory that it allows the authorities to convict anyone it wants removed from society. As such, law is more an instrument of oppression than the source of security.

In many ways, the Russian army in Ukraine has offered a reflection of the above. Many soldiers have been unwilling to fight, have deserted, and left their equipment behind. There have been reports of alcohol abuse, lack of discipline, murder and rape of civilians. Events in Bucha provide a prime example. Morale seems to be low too. Perhaps more important is the question of whether young Russian men from the countryside have the education and skills to serve in a modern army. It is clear that the quality of Russian weapons systems is more impressive than that of Russian leadership and human fighting capabilities. Relations between the rank and file are bad, with reportedly a relatively small, weak and notoriously ruthless mid-level of sergeants and lower officers and a bloated higher level of colonels and generals. I have no way of checking this information, but it sounds consonant with what is known of society at large. It would explain the high level of senior officers among the dead. Under fierce Ukrainian resistance, structures of command and authority clearly came apart.

It is hard to predict what the effects of this will be on the Russian political system. If Ukrainian resistance can hold on and the West remains united and determined enough to continue providing modern weapons, the Russian army will be stopped and thrown back. Retreating Russian soldiers will have an impact on Russian society that will be countered by repression by security services and police. The authorities will try (and probably largely fail) to stop information of a severe setback or defeat from filtering through to society. Much like in the aftermath of the Afghanistan conflict, family and friends of the dead and wounded will want those responsible punished. Will those be enough, however to prevent the collapse of the Russian political system or the demise of Vladimir Putin?

It is quite possible that, as Fiona Hill has pointed out, Putin will remain in place and be reduced to the role of a Robert Mugabe or a Bashir al Assad: the leader of a powerless country. Russian weakness would cause the country to turn in on itself for many years. There are several factors, however, that could point in a different direction. A powerful argument that pleads against such a scenario would be the view that many Russians have of the imperial values and mission of their state. Calls for some form of Russian resurrection would be heard. With defeat, officers in the Russian army could try to mount a coup. Oligarchs hit by sanctions could join in. A vocal urban population could provide the local mass support to topple the regime. Even the security services and the police could prove less than loyal. Regime change would seek to restore inner confidence and international prestige. Since social structures are largely absent, this would probably not result in democracy. The immediate search would be on for a new strong man. What that would mean for the strangle hold the present regime has on Russian society is anyone’s guess. It is possible there finally comes a fundamental rethink among the Russian elite of what a sustainable future for the country should be. In a way, the country would find itself back to 1991, with calls for a bigger role of civil society and more openness. It would be a glasnost and perestroika 2.0. Could there be new unrest in Chechnya? What about Georgia and Abkhazia?

Russia’s collapse could have huge consequences for the international scene. In Europe, democracy would be more solidly entrenched in the East. Although destruction and corruption in Ukraine would present problems, the country would probably end up joining both NATO and the EU in the foreseeable future. Hopefully, the war will have forged a Ukrainian identity that, unlike Russia, could offer the cohesion necessary for a mature democracy. The West would have the moral duty to help the country get to its feet again. Let’s hope European politicians finally and truly transcend the provincialism of the past. Poles, Balts, and Fins would be able to sleep more soundly. Elsewhere, European populists would lose an important source of support and money. There would be less trolls and bots on internet. Panslavism and authoritarian ideas would receive severe blows. It would provide for more stability in the former Yugoslav countries and could spell the end of Orbán’s authoritarian regime in Hungary. Russia would probably retreat from the Middle East and leave Armenia to fend for itself, with all the consequences that entails. Turkey’s influence in the Caucasus would grow. Much needed food exports to the Middle East and Africa would be able to resume.

The most important changes, however, would be found in the geopolitical situation of East Asia. Russia’s collapse would leave China as the sole anti-Western superpower. China would almost certainly increase its influence in Central Asia and try to exploit Russia’s weakness to gain a foothold in Siberia. After all, China’s dynamic economy needs raw materials. China also wants to project its power in the Arctic. Paradoxically, the West could find itself supporting the integrity of a weak Russian Federation against the advances of China. India would probably be more firmly in the Western camp than ever, a step it would have taken anyway since the loss of Afghanistan to the aliban, Pakistan’s close ties with China, and India’s need for better weapons against China.

Posted on

Spain’s Dilemma of Catalan Identity

Some years back I was standing in a shop in Barcelona. I had found a pack of yerba mate, the Argentinian national drink. Having grown up there, it was only natural for me to order it in Spanish. I was amazed when the shop owner refused to engage with me. He simply didn’t want to speak Spanish. Respectful of his wishes, I repeated my request in French and English. Each time he motioned to me he didn’t understand. So I told him in Spanish that I was sorry I didn’t speak Catalan. After all, I was a foreigner who wasn’t familiar with local conditions, but I did want to buy his item. I proposed that I speak in Spanish and that he answer in Catalan. (After all, with a good knowledge of both Spanish and French I guessed it would be possible to understand most of his Catalan.) Or, I asked him, didn’t he want to sell anything to me? I was relieved to see him agree to that.

Ever since, that visit to the shop in Barcelona has stuck with me as an example of the dilemma Spain faces in the Catalan question. The entire debate between the Spanish state and the nationalists has been a war of words, where politicians and activists are mostly talking past each other. It has turned into an ugly war of words and deeds of mutually exclusive nationalisms. It has resulted in a repression unworthy of Spain’s proud democratic traditions. The debate is not just about Catalonia, but about what kind of country Spain wants to be.

Let me make myself very clear from the start. It isn’t up to me to decide whether Spain and Catalonia agree on some arrangement within the Spanish constitutional order or whether Catalonia should gain independence. That is for the Spanish to decide for themselves. Spain is, however, part of the European family of democratic nations. Democracies are for, by and through the people. Our system is one that seeks to find consensual arrangements in which all people will be able to thrive and feel at home. That means a state that is respectful of the identities of all of its citizens. Constitutions are there to make that possible. Additionally, democracy is more than government by a majority. It also seeks acceptable ways to address the wishes of it minorities. It is furthermore not up to the state or the majority to determine whether there is a minority or what it is. In a free democracy, minorities should be allowed to do that for themselves. Within the democratic system, they should have standing to engage peacefully on matters that they think are important. When this concerns the personal identities of entire communities, the matter should be given even more attention.

Since 1978, Spain has created an impressive democracy. It has turned its back on monarchical absolutism and military dictatorship to become one of the solid European democracies. In doing so, it has acknowledged the diversity and cultural wealth of its population. In a significant break with its centralist past, there has been a large measure of autonomy granted to its regions. Inevitably, however, democracy has also been the fruit of a compromise with the past. Political systems may change, but mindsets will linger on. It has been said that the constitutional makeup of Spain was that of the Second Republic, with the king and the flag of its more authoritarian past affixed to it. This misses an important point. Spanish constitutional law was the result of a compromise between the Franquist elite and the emerging democratic movement. It made a remarkably smooth transition to democracy possible. By stipulating that Spain was one and indivisible, clear limits were set to the measure of diversity allowed within the country. A politically appointed Constitutional Tribunal was created as, amongst other things, the watchdog over this arrangement. Potentially, this created a structural contradiction between unity and diversity. There has always been a certain top-down rigidity in the system, that had to be balanced by autonomous measures to accommodate those at the bottom.

From the very start, this system has been contested. Naturally, the new-found freedoms that emerged after a long period of dictatorship, sought to explore the limits of the new order. In the beginning, the Basques drew the most attention. ETA was a violent continuation to a violent past. Its happy defeat was the result of more than the effective measures by Spain’s (and ultimately also France’s) intelligence and security forces. The Basques ultimately found a peaceful accommodation within the democratic order of the Spanish state, sapping support for ETA. From the very start, however, Catalan demands have followed a peaceful road. There has never been a Catalan organisation that is comparable to ETA. Violence isn’t part of the Catalan movement. That is why, perhaps, at first few observers outside Spain really took notice of it. But the problem has always been there.

So, what is really the problem here? Institutionally, Spain has all the means to accommodate regional and other differences. Politically it has a wide array of different parties with a broad range of ideals and ideas. On the whole, it has a professional and independent judiciary and a free press. Additionally, it has a large civil society with associations that espouse many different and conflicting goals. All the ingredients seem in place to make its democracy function smoothly. And let us face it, it mostly does so. There are merely a small number of issues, where the system seems to reach its limits. Most of these are issues that have a long past: the nature of the Spanish monarchy, dealing with the events of the Civil War, and yes, the Catalan question. These are issues, that evoke emotions in Spanish society. They are matters that touch the very identities of its citizens. And that is what makes matters so complicated.

As far as I can see, there are two main issues at play in the Catalan question. One is on national, cultural and linguistic matters and the other is about the amount of money Catalonia is paying to the central government.

The right to use the Catalan language is the most visible aspect of the Catalan nationalist movement. Catalan is a language that is related to Spanish, but is linguistically closer to Provençal. It used to be the native language of most of the east of Spain, from the Pyrenees to Murcia. Owing to the Spanish language policies of centralised, authoritarian governments, Catalan has been suppressed for ages and lost considerable ground. In the west and south, it has virtually disappeared. Both Aragón and Murcia now speak Spanish. Under the 1714 Nueva Planta decrees, Catalan was banished as an official language. During the Franco years, even the use of Catalan in public was forbidden. Under the democratic constitution of 1978, local governments have started to restore the use of Catalan to public life and education. Some schools now start off with teaching pupils only Catalan in the initial grades, even before they are taught Spanish. Interestingly, the language movement isn’t limited to Catalonia, though there Catalan has made perhaps the biggest comeback since the days of Franco. In Valencia, the local Catalan dialect is called Valenciano and is being promoted too. Recently, Catalan has been made the first official language on the Balear Islands. This has much been to the displeasure of Spanish-speaking residents, who share a strong tradition of mono-linguism with most other Romance language speakers. Catalan, in their view, is merely a quaint Spanish dialect and a nuisance. All of this has remained well within Spain’s constitutional order. There is something more fundamental that distinguishes nationalists in Catalonia from other Catalan speaking regions.

It is perhaps the aspiration of the Catalans in Catalonia to be recognised as a separate nation that has caused the biggest problems. In 2006, the Parliament of Catalonia approved a change in the preface of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia to stipulate that “the Parliament of Catalonia, having taken notice of the sentiment and will of the citizenship of Catalonia, has defined Catalonia as a nation”. After some substantial modifications by the Spanish Parliament and Senate, this statute was passed into law that same year. Importantly, the term “nation”, which in the Spanish constitution has been reserved for the indivisible Spanish nation as a whole, was changed into “the national reality”. Other changes, such as the status of Catalan as the language of Catalonia, its equality to Spanish in official use and references to the historical rights of Catalonia remained unchanged. It laid down a special position for Catalonia’s autonomous government, the Generalitat, in matters of civil law, cultural and linguistic affairs, education and the institutional makeup of the region. From the very beginning, this text was hotly contested by the centre-right opposition in Madrid.

Matters came to a head, first in 2010 when the Constitutional Tribunal declared the new Statute was unconstitutional and then the year after when the centre-right opposition gained power. Spanish intransigence sparked off a Catalan independence movement in the following years, culminating in an independence referendum. Although the referendum was called illegal by the Spanish centre-right government, it was held under difficult circumstances and unsurprisingly resulted in a Catalan nationalist victory. Most opponents to independence will have followed the guidelines of the Spanish government and had abstained. The referendum resulted in a largely symbolic declaration of independence in the Catalan Parliament, pending talks with Spain.

The reaction of the Spanish centre-right government to these events has been almost entirely of a legal nature. Simply put, the centre-right Partido Popular government (and the politically appointed Constitutional Tribunal) has limited itself to stressing the constitutional limits that Spain imposed on any autonomous region: Spain was one and indivisible as a nation. The Catalans could not be allowed to enjoy the status of a nation. In this, it has been followed by much of Spanish public opinion. The national newspaper El Mundo even went so far as to quote Cicero to say that the law was a cage to which each citizen found himself. Unlike earlier Socialist governments, the centre-right PP government has consistently refused to engage in any talks. On the contrary, its whole reaction to the referendum movement has consciously sought a confrontation. Instead of declaring that a referendum would merely be viewed as an instance of the freedom of expression, that would have no legal effect, it ruled that the referendum was unconstitutional and hence illegal. It subsequently used quite some police violence through Guardia Civil officers brought in from other parts of the country, to try to repress the event and make voting impossible. After the referendum, it prosecuted politicians and organisers on the basis of a law on sedition that made violence against the state a crime. The problem was, as many Spanish lawyers weren’t slow to point out, that the Catalans had entirely engaged in peaceful events. Attempts to show that the Catalan politicians were corrupt and had misused public funds were subject to interpretation. The Spanish authorities proceeded to arrest a number of Catalan politicians, though it took very long to see them convicted. The nationalist leader, Carles Puigdemont, fled abroad with a couple of supporters. Embarrassingly, Spanish requests for his extradition were turned down by courts in several EU countries. Foreign judges were unimpressed with the charges on sedition and differed in the interpretation of corruption the Spanish authorities advanced in court. One observer astutely pointed out that the attitude of the Spanish government resembled that of the Inquisition: the Catalans had sinned against the Spanish constitution and their only salvation lay in a very public repentance. Spain is still waiting.

An underlying issue is that of the contributions Catalonia has to make to the national treasury. It quite plausibly complains that together with Madrid it makes by far the largest payments, but that Madrid unlike Catalonia receives massive investments from the central government. By comparison, that other hotbed of separatism, the Basque country, has a much better deal. All these figures are indeed a matter of public record. To be fair, this is an issue that could always have played and which wouldn’t have arisen as sharply without the larger identity struggle.

At present, there seems to be a stalemate in the Catalan problem. Within the EU, Spain has clearly lost face through its brash actions. It has lost a number of court cases requesting extraditions. By and large, however, the EU and the other member states have limited their reactions to a reserved and muted criticism. As social media show, this is very much to the frustration of the Catalan nationalists, who really expect to much from the EU. There are simply other, more pressing problems, such as Brexit, the Covid crisis and the far more serious attacks on democracy and the rule of law in Poland and Hungary. As a consensual union of states, the EU simply lacks the tools to deal head-on with the Poles and the Hungarians, let alone the Catalan problem. In Spain itself, the conflict with the Catalan nationalists has spurred Spanish nationalism to an extent never seen since 1978. A new, crypto-Franquist party, Vox, has appeared on the scene. In regional elections in Catalonia, the pro-Spain party Ciudadanos emerged as the largest party, although overall the Catalan nationalists retained their majority. Ciudadanos has since been more than decimated in national elections. The Partido Popular, hoping not to be outdone by Vox, is still the main standard bearer of Spanish nationalist intransigence. It remains to be seen when the new Socialist minority government will find the time to address the problem. Covid and economic collapse rightly have their main attention.

The main question behind the Catalan problem, to my mind, is whether Spain’s elite and its electorate want to offer a place to the Catalans that is acceptable to Catalans. As I have said at the beginning, a democracy should be there for all of its people. That doesn’t mean that the Catalan nationalists get everything they want. It would be a game of give and take. It was only when the Spanish government closed the door to an acceptable accommodation within the constitutional arrangements of the country, that Catalan nationalists actively started to campaign for independence and received substantial support from the Catalan electorate at the same time. That was the moment the Catalan nationalists stopped talking and resorted to action. As such, the problem is to no small extent one of Madrid’s own making. After all, there could be other possible interpretations of the oneness and indivisibility of the Spanish nation. How else would the far-reaching nature of Spain’s autonomous regions be possible? Or would the official Spanish interpretation exclude Catalans from the Spanish nation? Does Spain wish to force its identity views on its citizens?

It is to be hoped that the Socialist government returns to the path of peaceful talks and frees what are in fact political prisoners. The centre-right Partido Popular could contribute to the peace and stability of the country by playing a constructive role in such talks. Spain has enough problems as it is without Catalonia. Repression looks ugly and will not make it go away. It will merely serve to damage the country and strengthen separatist resolve even further. Finding an acceptable outcome for all to the Catalan problem may be a way of taking Spain a step further away from its sometimes authoritarian reflexes and towards a more consensual mindset. Perhaps a game of give and take between brothers could provide an opening. It will mean having to overcome a lot of emotions and mistrust on both sides. Dare I say it?, it will also mean accepting the possibility of Catalan independence. Perhaps paradoxically, such a course could be the best way of keeping Catalonia as a contented part of Spain.

That is the dilemma democratic Spain faces.

Posted on

Europe is an Idea

Since the carnage of the Second World War, the democratic states of Europe have been forging ever closer bonds between themselves. After three major wars in a row, France and Germany decided to co-operate with one another so as to make a future war impossible. Other democratic states decided to join. We Europeans decided to stop destroying our societies and send entire generations of young men to their deaths. We wanted a permanent peace.

Our Europe is a relatively small continent that contains many talented populations, scenic beauties, historical treasures and natural resources. In this relatively small space, most states traditionally coveted what other states possessed. Before 1945, European states attempted to fulfil these desires by waging wars of conquest or plunder on their neighbours. From the end of the eighteenth century onwards, nationalism provided a stronger dynamic for such wars. A century later, public education saw entire populations indoctrinated in the mystique of their nation. Whole populations united in a collective will to kill other nations. War was presented as desirable.  These developments made divisions between nations deeper and more durable. The European states of the past shared a history of killing each other. Between 1870 and 1945, more than a hundred million Europeans died during armed conflicts. Some seven million persons perished in one of the biggest crimes ever committed against humanity. No more!

Every single European nation suffered grievous losses. I am a Dutchman with a German family name. In three wars, the German branch of my family was essentially annihilated on successive battlefields. Through my mother’s Huguenot family, I lost relatives on the French side too. During the Second World War, Dutch relatives were killed in battle or locked up in the German concentration camp Buchenwald and in several Japanese internment camps in the Dutch Indies. One of my mother’s Jewish classmates disappeared in the Holocaust. When I was born, the Netherlands was still reeling in poverty from the consequences of the war. Few Dutchmen know that in 1940 the Netherlands narrowly escaped the fate of nations such as the Poles and the Czechoslovaks, where the Nazis decided to exterminate all intellectuals. Such nations suffered even more. More than 100,000 Dutch citizens, who happened to be Jewish, were murdered. More than 2 million Polish Jews were murdered.

Against this background, European democratic politicians, businessmen, and intellectuals decided after 1945 that the killing had to be stopped once and for all. Instead of killing, they proposed to share. The first impulse of the new European project was economic in nature. Sharing coal and steel was instituted to take away the instruments of warfare. Further steps were taken to form a shared economic community. The famous freedoms –of people, products, services and capital— showed, however, that further integration was necessary to make the European Community a success. In the event, it took a generation for a political union to begin to take shape with a shared European Parliament. Before that, the EC had been a mostly bureaucratic, intergovernmental organisation. In the past thirty years, the European Union has sought to change that. By developing better democratic structures it has tried to come closer to ordinary people. Through its policies, it has also brought Europe’s peoples together in a single zone of peace, freedom and wealth, which most young people take for granted.

The past fifteen years have shown, however, that an essential element is lacking in the European Union. For all the things we share, we lack a popularly shared European identity. We lack a view for the future. That is why in 2005 countries such as France, the Netherlands, and Ireland voted down the European constitution. That is why the 2010 financial crisis saw divisive nationalism and populism flare up in many EU member states. Persons in the different member states are still raised in the backward looking national traditions of their own respective countries without much attention for the future of our European Union. We profit from the promising future of the EU, but we live in our own mental worlds of the past. In so many ways, we do not understand each other. Our nationalisms offer us different worldviews. France with its tradition of the French Revolution, the “laicité” and its devastating feud with Germany, Germany with its democratic rebirth after its unification and its horrific modern wars, Hungary with its nationalist fight against the Habsburg Empire, the loss of most of its territories after the First World War and the Soviet oppression, democratic Spain with its past of isolation and Fascist dictatorship. I could go on for a while. How will that help us for a European future?

We need a unifying message for all Europeans. So far, Europe has largely been an affair of the elite. If the EU wants to be a democracy, that will have to change. There is an emotional need for all of us to understand why we are building a common Europe. We need to realise we are increasingly growing into communities that share certain precious values and aspirations that will make Europe a safe and wealthy place to live for our children. This goes far beyond the often stale and rational human rights theories that the EU is setting forth. We need a story that tells us what we want Europe to be as a home for all us. In short, we need an idea of Europe for a common future.

Surprisingly perhaps, a basic idea of Europe could come from a merger of the different nationalisms within an overarching framework of democratic principles. In this way, Europe can acquire a popular identity for ordinary people. This could be a practical approach towards the creation of a European idea. Nationalism, or call it patriotism, can be a sign of a healthy society, which is proud of its past and its achievements and confident for the future. It gives citizens an identity that is more than a set of rational explanations. But it can be more. Besides focusing on a story for a particular country or ethnic group, a healthy nationalism can also contain an underlying history of what all Europeans share and aspire to. To varying degrees, we have all been influenced by Christianity, the Renaissance, the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, the Enlightenment, the Industrial Revolution, nationalisms, democracy and the scientific and technological revolutions of the past century. In art, literature, philosophy, and political movements no coherent story can be told without reference to several or even most European countries. At a popular level, we have amongst many other things a shared culture of football, fashion and outdoor life. European thought and culture is the envy of the world. This could form the basis for a common and confident view of what Europe wants to be in the future.

Nationalisms actually do not need to be exclusive. Europeans can be familiar with each other’s stories in a way that doesn’t make nationalism a zero-sum game. This can be done by respecting the stories of others and being honest about the less appealing aspects of one’s own. As in democratic politics, there should be room for diversity and mutual respect. In many countries that may mean a process of reconciliation with both other countries and the own past. But that is not enough. It is important to provide a common idea for the future. How do we take Europe from here? Europe should be a land of promise, where shared dreams and aspirations can be fulfilled. Based on that, perhaps, an inclusive idea of what Europe for all of us means can emerge.

I have no doubt that formulating an idea of Europe will be a complicated process. We are a very diverse continent. Politicians, opinion makers and intellectuals should have a role in this, but so should ordinary people. There should be more debate about the need for an emotional commitment to Europe. After all, the world is fast growing smaller. Larger countries, such as China and India, are increasingly making themselves heard. In order to matter for the future, Europe needs to draw together. The question who we are as Europeans and what we stand for is more pressing every day. This should draw attention too to the need for more bilingual and multilingual Europeans. We need to speak and read each other’s languages and cultures to draw closer to one another. The example of Switzerland shows that it can be done.

If the European Union is to survive into the next century and the member states are serious about their commitments, the formulation of an idea of what Europe exactly is to ordinary people will have to receive the urgent attention that it deserves. The EU has weathered an impressive amount of crises and setbacks in recent years. In spite of popular movements calling for the rolling back of the EU, national majorities everywhere, with the exception of the UK, have continued to support the EU. People, however, want more than cold policies and agreements from Brussels, that often feel very distant from their daily lives. People want ideals and emotions, that will uplift good times and see them through the difficult ones. We need to be proudly aware of Europe in our daily lives. It should be an idea of Europe that we can warm to and hold a promise for the future. It should be an idea that is spread at schools, pubs, markets, internet, politics and in the media. In short, it should become our shared idea.

Posted on

Please Listen to Ai Weiwei

During the  1980s, I had the privilege of studying in China for a year. It was an unforgettable experience. I went through a full-fledged culture shock and survived a winter on dishes of Chinese cabbage laced with five peanuts at a time. Eating peanuts with chopsticks was no easy matter. Back then China was poor. Reform, however, was kicking in and the sheer dynamism of a huge country just emerging from years of civil war and failed socialist experiments was impressive. In the following months I discontinued my courses and rote-learning at university to make a journey through China proper. Talking to people on trains and a ship on the Yangtse River greatly improved my Chinese and made me get to know the country. Wandering through cities showed me the beauty of the architecture and the delights of its dishes. I came back with bags full of books, old and new. It fostered a love for an ancient country with a great culture, cuisine and above all, people, that has stayed with me ever since.

In those days, Beijing boasted an artisan village, that constituted something of a free-zone for all kinds of young people who did not want to conform to the strictures of China’s Party-state. Some of my fellow students lived there and went on to become respected academics. Ai Weiwei was there too pioneering new art forms and ways of political discourse. Ai has since grown into one of China’s most renowned artists and a freethinker. In those days before the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, the village was only possible because reformist leaders such as Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang allowed for a certain measure of freedom. Some in the West saw the village as the beginning of a civil society that would ultimately foster freedom and democracy in a rapidly developing nation. Wealth would soon lead to democracy, they reasoned. They had failed to take account of the resilience of the Party-state and the fabric of Chinese society. The failure of the student and workers movement in 1989 marked the end of attempts at democratisation for the foreseeable future.

In a recent interview with the BBC, Ai Weiwei has said that it is too late to curb China’s global influence. He rightly points out that the West should have worried about China decades ago. The problem is that Western politicians and China scholars have for very long entertained a far too rosy and rather condescending picture of China. As China developed, so the story went, it would grow more like the West. There was no such thing as cultural differences. During China’s early reforms, critical voices amongst Western academics were silenced or side-tracked. As China’s economy grew, a growing number of businesses acquired a stake in the development of the country. There was little or no attention for the nature of China’s political regime. Now China is a growing global power with an agenda of its own, there finally seems to be a rethink.

Western understanding of China, to my mind, has been marred by a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the Chinese Party-state. China scholars focusing on politics have viewed the country as a version of the secular Marxist-Leninist system. It was seen as little more than a carbon copy of the Soviet Union. After 1989, despite some setbacks it would surely develop into a democratic market economy. In this view, the People’s Republic of China represented a radical break with China’s Confucianist past. Events since the Tiananmen Incident have shown there is far more continuity with China’s past than once thought. This is not the place to go into the details of the CCP’s ideology, but some main outlines here are relevant. In China –Imperial or Communist—the leadership has always claimed to possess the monopoly on truth. In a sense, Confucianist or Communist, the regime in power has been what Westerners would call a theocracy. Only, the Chinese “God” has always been an impersonal force of Heaven or History. Its aim is to align society with a perceived order of Heaven (Confucianism and static) or History (Communist and dynamic), in which there are fixed relations of senior and junior between people. Equality is virtually unknown as a positive value in Chinese thought. Unlike Western nations, Chinese politics is not geared towards the individual freedom and well-being of its citizens, but towards the collective wealth and power of the state to which individual interests must always submit. Individual well-being is merely a possible side effect of the power of the state. As the Mao-cult and Xi Jinping’s assumption of imperial powers show, even under Communism this mindset only ever allowed for one supreme leader.

Ever since the late nineteenth century thinker Yan Fu, Chinese intellectuals have been intent on restoring China’s legitimate pre-eminence on earth through the acquisition of wealth and power. Since the 1980s, China has successfully sought to emulate Japan in its drive for economic development. Relying on a solid bureaucratic system and traditions of entrepreneurship, the state has been extremely effective in its concerted and planned drive towards modernity. In forty years’ time, China has lifted its more than one billion population out of abject poverty into a relative ease. A great feat by any standards. There is now a thriving middle class of business owners and professionals. The Party-state is nervous, however, of too powerful billionaires and any critical thinking. Billionaire Jack Ma has had to step down as director/owner of Alibaba. Countless others have seen their wings clipped. The clampdown in Hong Kong suggests there is far more contention in Chinese society than one would suspect. Many ordinary Chinese know societies such as Taiwan and Hong Kong are freer, more democratic than theirs. The Party-state is fearful of ideological spillovers from places it does not control. Clearly, not everyone in China shares the elite’s authoritarian and imperialist ideas, although nationalist pride runs strong throughout the country. China’s press and internet are largely shut off from the outside world and closely monitored. The Party-state has allowed private enterprise and society at large to develop within a Party cage. Since a couple of years, all privately owned companies must have Party members in their boards of directors. This is to ensure that every business works in the interests of the Party. The example of Huawei and its 5G network is a telling tale of this strategy. All social organisations belong to the Party or are closely monitored. Islam and Christianity are officially tolerated, but as events in Xinjiang show, can be brutally repressed. China is not only economically very successful, it is probably the world’s most efficient police state.

Yan Fu’s idea behind the drive for wealth and power was always presented as a legitimate goal against and revenge on Western colonialism and imperialism. The Opium Wars (1839-1842) against the British had left deep wounds in Yan’s and generally Chinese pride. Late in the nineteenth century, however, official Confucianism was discredited as the worldview that could find an answer to China’s humiliations. The search was on for a way forward that combined Western technology with Chinese morals. This is the backdrop against which modern Chinese politics has played out. Communism first promised to be a solution that fitted China’s bureaucratic culture. The Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, however, pressed home on the Chinese elite that Marxism-Leninism was not after all the ideological guarantee for China’s path to pre-eminence. The search for a better worldview has been going on ever since. From the early 1980s, there has been a quiet return of traditional Chinese ideas. Marxism-Leninism has been qualified as being “with Chinese characteristics”. In recent years, a group led by Xi Jinping’s advisor Wang Huning seems to have found the answer in China’s Legalist philosophy. Along with Confucianism, Legalism was once one of the main philosophical schools in China’s antiquity. For those with an interest in philosophy, its main philosopher, Han Feizi, is well worth a read. His theories formed the ideology of the Qin-state (of terracotta army fame; Qin is pronounced Cheen). Legalists ruled the state not through morality (as the Confucianists did), but through a leadership mystique that resorted to laws and strict regulations within an historically dynamic framework. A tightly regimented country was to develop the economic muscle to direct its military power towards all the other Chinese states. In 221 BCE, through a policy of divide and rule and after many bloody wars, Qin ultimately succeeded in its aim of the unification of the world as the Chinese knew it back then. This was the beginning of an Imperial and bureaucratic China, that lasted until 1911.

In recent years, the People’s Republic of China has begun to display a large number of Legalist traits. To all intents and purposes, Xi Jinping has made his leadership permanent, the rule by (not: of) law has been greatly strengthened and economic development has continued at a breath-taking pace. As I have outlined above, in attempt to shore up Party influence, society has been regimented more tightly. Furthermore, unlike his predecessor Deng Xiaoping, who urged the Chinese to keep a low-key posture on foreign and military affairs, Xi has been far more assertive abroad. He has reorganised and modernised the armed forces. His foreign policies have become more aggressive, especially against the United States, which is perceived as the world’s number one nation. At the same time, China has conflicts with most of its neighbours. These involve a large number of territorial disputes that threaten to develop into armed conflicts. More importantly, China has presented itself as a major geopolitical player. It has launched its Double Belt policy towards the West. It has sought to encircle India and divide the European Union. Along this route, it is building naval bases to support its growing fleet. Additionally, it has developed ties with countries that can provide it with much needed natural resources. It has been especially active in Australia, Africa and Latin America. Finally, it has increasingly been using its press and cultural outlets to influence views around the world. It often does so in the same high-handed way it is used to dealing with matters internally.

All of these are worrying developments for the West. China is changing from a country that pursues a peaceful economic development into one that projects its power through economic and other means. Already it is devising organisations and ways to by-pass the international system. Unlike the EU and other major international players, China resolutely insists on bilateral international agreements, as it will usually be the senior party. It is busy building its own global financial system with its currency, the renminbi, at its core. Lately it has started to unroll its own, officially backed e-currency. It has issued large loans to countries through which it has gained power and influence. All of this would sound normal for a large country with economic clout, but it is the aim for which this is done that gives pause for thought.

Ai Weiwei is right. It is too late to curb China’s growing influence. In a sense, it would also be unwanted to do so. China is a very large and increasingly prosperous country that legitimately deserves a prominent place in this world. Its people, products, science and culture have much to recommend. Its people are rapidly becoming a valuable part of the world community. The international community should however be in no doubt about the intentions of China’s political elite. China has a deeply intolerant political system that will not hesitate to export its brand of authoritarianism to other states. It will continue its attempts at becoming the most powerful nation on earth. Whether it will succeed in this is by no means a forlorn matter. Whether internal democratisation will ensure that this rise will be a peaceful and freedom-loving one remains to be seen. In the meantime the world should be firm in its commitment to our international system of free, equal and sovereign nations. Multilateral agreements should make clear to China that friendship and trade are welcome, but that armed intervention and threats are not. Territorial disputes should be resolved, not through threats or force of arms, but within the framework of international law. China’s leaders should be told that our political freedoms, such as the freedom of expression, are matters of principle and non-negotiable. That includes open and free discussions of China and its policies in other countries. That also includes a debate with China on internally observing certain norms that the world community has agreed upon as basic rights for all. Citizens, after all, should not be the slaves of the state. Only then can we continue to enjoy China as a valued member of the international community. For that, I am sure it is still not too late.

Posted on

Belarus and European Provincialism

Recent events in Belarus have shown yet again the enduring appeal of a free and open society, that has the well-being of its citizens as its fundamental aim. Belarusians have massively taken to the streets to protest against an authoritarian culture of fear and corruption. Let there be no misunderstanding, it is in essence a modern slave rebellion against a neo-czarist state. That takes a considerable amount of courage, but it also risks pushing Mr Lukashenko into the arms of Russia. Mr Putin, a fellow neo-czarist, is only too willing to respond. Aware that Russia is too small and weak to play an enduring role as a world power, he intends to gain back as much as possible of the former Russian Empire. Sandwiched between the European Union and China, a weak Russia, could indeed turn into a geopolitical liability. After Crimea, Belarus presents an enticing opportunity. Putin also eyes the rest of Ukraine and the Baltic states, each of which contain sizeable Russian minorities. He has also made his imperial ambitions clear in Syria and has unleashed a vast corruption and disinformation campaign against the West. Success in Belarus, could make Mr Putin seem unstoppable.

Mindful of history, Central European and Baltic states have been quick to respond. They have imposed sanctions on the Lukashenko regime and warned against any Russian interference. As former Soviet satellites, they should know what they are doing. Sadly, Western European nations have been slow to respond. As Mrs Merkel’s response to the refugee problem in 2015 has shown, Germany is curiously unaware or uninterested in Central European sensibilities. France and Germany are perhaps reminded of the failures of a toothless diplomacy in Ukraine. Although Mrs Merkel has subsequently imposed sanctions on Russia, important economic ties with Russia have so far seen them steer clear of any real confrontation in what they consider to be Russia’s backyard. Too many Western politicians and businessmen have important financial interests at play.

National European governments by and large like to view the European Union as a mainly economic enterprise. As the talks on Brexit show, the European Union is strong when it speaks with one voice. In matters of foreign affairs and defence, however, unity has been sorely lacking. It is generally pointed out that the EU is a giant in economic and trade matters, but a dwarf when it comes to foreign affairs and defence. Our mentality has been shaped by the Pax Americana, in which we could always rely on the United States to preserve our peace and security. With US attention diverted to Asia, we must realise that has now changed. Clearly, Mr Trump is no friend of the EU. We still have NATO, but I hear doubts about invoking article 5 (an attack on one is any attack on us all) when it really matters. During recent talks with China, politicians expressed the wish that Europe be more united when dealing with this country. That is indeed imperative. China has adopted a far more aggressive stance in recent years. It has actively sought to divide the member states and create extraterritorial enclaves within the EU. In Greece, it has succeeded. Europe has to learn to take care of itself on a global scale.

If the European Union is to endure, it is important to realise that we have to stand up and protect what we hold in common in the face of the world. Economics and power politics are intimately related and the world is fast growing smaller. In the past half century or so Europeans have built a common market, a customs union and (in part) adopted a shared currency. We are, in fact, one economy. Gradually, the competences of the European Union have been extended to other areas as well. European citizens are taking freedom of movement for granted and enjoy the benefits of local voting rights, health coverage and educational programmes. The European Union is a project that is based on fostering the well-being of its citizens. We are a beacon of freedom and affluence for the rest of the world. Jealous of their sovereignty, however, the member states have so far sought to stress the inter-governmental nature of foreign affairs and defence. Calls for rolling back economic integration have started to sound more loudly as well. Each state has preferred to pursue its own goals within a mental framework that is largely based on a nineteenth century state of affairs. Most voters, busy as they are with their daily lives, don’t really care. Most will take our peace and security for granted. This is a dangerous road to go down.

It is time the European member states transcend their provincialism. We are each of us too small to matter in an increasingly global and contested world. If we want to speak with one voice to China, a common stance towards events in Belarus would be a good start. Central European and Baltic states need to feel safe as a part of the European Union. It would bring home to them that they are a part of a larger whole that has their interests at heart. The larger states, Germany and France, should listen to the fears and warnings of countries that have suffered centuries of oppression and slavery and show leadership. Other states will listen and participate. Imposing EU-wide sanctions on the Lukashenko regime could be a good first step. Mr Putin should be told in no uncertain terms that he should stay out. Germany should tell him publicly that the Nord-2 pipeline could be cancelled if he does not. It would incidentally be a good indication that we take climate change seriously. But that is not enough. As our support for Ireland in the Brexit talks has shown, the EU stands to gain from intensifying cooperation on foreign affairs. There should be a common plan that takes the wishes of Central Europe and the Baltic states seriously. There should be support for the democratic aspirations of Belarusians. Russian involvement should be discouraged by threatening with measures that more seriously hurt the Putin regime. It could additionally be used as a first step towards reducing a dangerous influence of the Russian state in our politics and business life. It could even support democracy there too.

The crisis in Belarus presents the member states of the European Union with an opportunity. Mr Lukashenko’s surprise inauguration today could be used as a good reason for a united and powerful response. Importantly, by discarding their provincialism and speaking with one voice on Belarus, European member states will show both Central and Baltic Europeans and Belarusians what the EU can do for them. The rest of the world will surely take note. Putin may be deterred from his more dangerous designs. EU member states could build on this to speak with one voice in other matters as well. Ultimately, it will give our economic ties and trade relations with the rest of the world so much more punch. It could serve to invigorate our alliance with the US and strengthen NATO. If we are to counter Putin’s aggression and China’s divisive policies towards Europe, we will have to show that we are at one in other matters as well. It will give our leaders the authority and leverage to one day ask all member states to talk as one not just to China, but to the rest of the world. It will make the world a better and more secure place for all Europeans.

Let’s bury European provincialism now. It is an opportunity that should not be missed.

Posted on

The Sovereignty of Fuzziness

One hundred years ago, Europe was dealing with the aftermath of the First World War. Germany was subjected to a crippling Treaty of Versailles and Hungary was about to lose three fifths of its territory. By comparison to the Middle East, however, they were let off relatively lightly. In the Arab parts of the defunct Ottoman Empire, five new, independent states were created: Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Palestine and Jordan. Publicly, this was portrayed as a reward for Arab support to the Allied cause during the war. However, all of these nations were subjected to mandates of the newly created League of Nations, which turned these states into virtual colonies. Lebanon and Syria were assigned to France and Palestine, Jordan and Iraq to the British Empire. This was the result of a secret war-time agreement between the two colonial powers, which shared out respective spheres of influence: the infamous Sykes-Picot Treaty. It laid down borders that have survived to the present day. Importantly, among the reasons for the mandates imposed by the two Allied powers, was that these nations weren’t ready yet to assume full sovereignty. They needed a period of tutelage first before becoming fully sovereign.

Now, a hundred years later, the British Empire has disappeared and the United Kingdom is in the throes of Brexit. Oddly enough, if there is one term that characterises the more ideological aspects of Brexit, it is sovereignty. Sovereignty is a tricky term. Basically, sovereignty means that a state is legally considered the equal of other states within an internationally accepted set of rules. All states should by and large adhere to those rules or else face the consequences. Taliban Afghanistan experienced what that meant when it harboured those behind the 9/11 attack. Brexiters at large, however, associate sovereignty with “taking back control”. Twitter is full of such noisy nationalists. The United Kingdom, or should I say England?, should to be able to have its own laws without any interference from treaties or foreigners. Sovereignty for them is really about regaining lost powers. England should be restored to its former glory and the rest of the world should step aside to allow it to do so. In the background, I sense a dose of Imperial phantom pain. Once again, Glorious England should to be able to impose its wishes on others as it has done in the past.

Until about a year ago, in spite of all the convoluted rhetoric, the British government adhered to a more sensible and realistic course. It basically accepted it had entered into a set of international agreements that went beyond the European treaties. The most intractable of these, of course, was the Good Friday or Belfast Agreement. Although Britain retained its sovereignty over Northern Ireland, in practice powers were quietly shared with the Republic of Ireland. This was because, although it took on the form of an international treaty, it was far more than that. As an agreement between people, it inherently touched upon the internal affairs of two communities. Its core premise, that the people of the island of Ireland should determine their own future, could only really work if the United Kingdom, or at least Northern Ireland, and the Republic of Ireland were closely aligned in legislation. As long as Britain remained a member of the European Union, that posed no problem. With Brexit, even Britain’s rather fuzzy constitutional arrangements are being tested to their limits. The Tory government under Prime Minister Theresa May was aware of this conundrum, but negotiated a unsatisfactory Withdrawal Agreement in which realism prevailed. Then, on a popular wave of Brexit nationalism, the new Prime Minister Boris Johnson coasted to an impressive election victory. Earlier, he had negotiated some minor changes to the Withdrawal Agreement and subsequently signed it and had it ratified by Parliament. It was an agreement, Johnson assured, where Britain could have its cake and eat it.

Why then, is the British government suddenly trying to pass legislation that openly promises to violate what is simply an international treaty? British assertions that the Withdrawal Agreement will undermine the Good Friday Agreement will only convince the Brexit faithful and the one Northern Irish party that opposed the Good Friday Agreement in the first place. Importantly, the US political class isn’t buying it and this argument will probably quietly be dropped. A more interesting argument has been put forward by Britain’s chief negotiator in Brussels, David Frost: the EU isn’t treating the United Kingdom as a sovereign nation and should start to do so. Wait a minute! Isn’t sovereignty earned rather than conceded? What happened to those arguments from a century ago? Has Britain in its quest for former glory decided to behave as nation that considers itself under tutelage? Has Britain in its attempts to once again rule the waves decide to waive the rules? I hope not. Actually, I believe there is a more fundamental, underlying reason for the present course of the British government.

Fuzziness is the keyword here. Negotiations with the European Union have revealed an old culture clash between the tendency of British common law to restrict legislation to essentials (and leave many details to be worked out later through practice) and the propensity of the European Union’s continental law mentality to legislate down to the last detail. My take is that British Brexit politicians originally expected that the Withdrawal Agreement would leave enough room for fuzziness in the trade agreement that is now being negotiated with the EU. Rules could then be bent their way in the future. The problem here is that many British politicians, unlike their civil servants, do not read law texts. As trade talks progressed, Brexit politicians increasingly realised the wording of the Withdrawal Agreement was to closely knit for such fuzziness. Crucially, they came to see that the agreement left no room for wriggling about the de facto border down the Irish Sea. This hurt Brexit Britain’s sovereign sensitivities. Hence Mr. Frost’s rather embarrassing remark that the EU wasn’t treating the United Kingdom as a sovereign nation.

I wonder what Palmerston, Disraeli or Churchill would have thought of Brexit and prime-minister Johnson. One of the hallmarks of British Imperialism was its ruthless  and practical realism. After the Second World War, the British Empire was technically bankrupt and soon fell apart. Post-war Prime Minister Churchill was practical enough to realise the future of Britain was best served by functioning as a bridge between the United States and nascent Europe. Grand theories and visions, such as blindly following the Will of the People, were best left to the French. For all its defaults, however, French theory is strictly rational and crystal clear. Brexit populism and its insistence upon the Will of the People is rather less so. In a world where powers are shifting, I wonder how far Britain will get with its sovereignty of fuzziness. I hope it will come to its senses and wish it well.