The war against Ukraine is not going well for Russia. After its initial attack on 24 February 2022, Russia has had to retreat its troops from the north of Ukraine. By all accounts, the Russian army has suffered heavy losses in manpower and material. Reportedly more than a quarter of the 120 Battalion Tactical Groups, it initially fielded, have been rendered “combat ineffective”. The war continues in the east and the south of Ukraine, but at best progress there has been slow. Amazingly, the city of Mariupol has still not fully been taken. One belated change has been to put all Russian troops under a single commander. However, instead of pausing to recover, replenish, and regroup, the Russian army seems to be drip-feeding its troops to the Ukrainian army. Both the Russian air force and navy haven’t particularly excelled either.
There is now a lively debate in the West and elsewhere about what went wrong and what options remain for Russia. There is quite a long list of items that can readily be made by the experts. From bad leadership, corruption, faulty planning, and a failure to heed even the most basic principles of modern warfare to problems in maintenance, logistics, training, command structures, communications, concerted action, and tactical fighting. Perhaps the most damning verdict is that the Russian army has seemed unable to learn from its mistakes, past and present. The suggestion is that its performance, that to many is reminiscent of World War 2 tactics, will not improve. In fact, one is even reminded of some of the more disastrous military campaigns of czarist times. Russia’s famed intelligence services have not faired any better.
If the initial aim of the campaign seems to have been to turn Ukraine into a puppet state, much like Belarus, or to simply annex it to Russia, the question remains what Russia’s present, clearly more moderate, aims are. At best, the Russian army could occupy and annex the Donbas and parts of southern Ukraine. A more ambitious scenario could see it advance to take territory up to the Dniepr River and a southern corridor up to Transdniestria. By taking the city of Odesa, Russia would be able to strangle much of Ukraine’s economy and menace Moldova too. It would form a fitting conclusion to Russia’s stated aim of Ukrainian denazification, that is Putin-speak for punishing Ukraine for turning its back on Russia.
However, the Russian losses are reportedly so high that one may seriously wonder whether Russia will be able to sustain its attack. Of an army of some 190,000 soldiers that launched the invasion on 24 February, an estimated 15 to 20 thousand have already been killed. Allowing for a ratio of one killed to two wounded, this would mean that anywhere between 45,000 and 60,000 soldiers of a total of 190,000 have been eliminated –somewhere between a quarter and a third. That is a staggering amount, rendered all the more significant if one realises that an army is made up of front soldiers and support. Many of Russia’s best front soldiers have been killed. Reports speak of up to ten generals as well. Numerically, Russia may be able to replenish its forces, but it is questionable whether it will be able to replace them with men who possess the knowledge and skills required of modern warfare. Questions of Russia’s own more general security will also surface.
It is reasonable to question whether even this more limited scenario is at Russia’s grasp. So far, the Ukrainian defences have held up quite well. As WW2 has made clear, quick “Blitzkrieg” wars are basically won by military means. Slower wars are decided by economic clout. It was never in much doubt that the Allies would win WW2, just how long it would take. With the West supporting Ukraine, something similar may be at play now. Russia had about two or three weeks to defeat Ukraine and present the rest of the world with a fait accompli. Now this chance has been missed, it will have to face a Ukraine that is supported by the united economic might of the West. It may call up more soldiers, but it cannot undo the loss of surprise and skills. The slow pace of war in the East does not bode well for Russia. Economic clout will now be brought into full play.
More generally, it should not be forgotten, that Russia’s GDP is about the same as that of Spain. Compared to the four other permanent members of the UN’s Security Council, it is an economic gnome. It’s economy is also one-sided. It is heavily dependent on the export of raw materials from its vast territory -especially oil and gas, and the production of weapons. Both will be hard hit by the unprecedented sanctions that have been imposed by the West. Without Western revenues in foreign currencies of oil and gas, Russia will be cash-strapped. Moreover, many of Russia’s best weapons systems contain hi-tech Western components that it will not be able to replace. Traditionally, much of Russia’s R&D has been acquired legally or illegally from the West too. Its loss of scientific contacts and the expulsion of spooks will leave Russia largely without the means to modernise its army. Russia’s broader economy has also been severely hit by Western sanctions. Much of Russian society is in for a fall in living standards and an ongoing brain drain as well.
Russian society, in fact, is weak. Outside of the larger cities, social cohesion seems largely absent. There is barely a real middle class. Unlike the West, Russian culture does not know of a contract theory or a system of rights as the basis of society. Wage labour is considered a form of exploitation. Russia’s problem is that it is a very large, sparsely inhabited, and disunited country with many different ethnicities. For years now, the country has experienced a reduction in population and reportedly alcohol and drugs abuse are widespread. What keeps the country together is the state. It is the state that provides many jobs to poor and uneducated young people in the countryside. Its sprawling security services and army enlist many young men. At the same time, however, Russia’s political system impedes its economic development. Although private enterprise now exists, any business exceeding a certain size, will be co-opted into the state system or suppressed. Recently, president Putin has been clamping down on its small, independent civil society, such as the press and NGOs.
In many ways, Russia still has many of the characteristics of its czarist and Soviet past. Power is concentrated in the hands of one man, who commands fealty from his followers. Under him, there are networks of people who understand the informal rules, or ponyatiya, that will guarantee their positions and income. Within these networks, loyalty is primarily directed not at the supreme leader, but at the person most directly in a leadership role. A large part of the income of such networks is assured through a system of institutionalised corruption that thrives off society and the immense natural resources of the country. The bigger and more powerful the network, the bigger the share of the social spoils. All state agencies partake of these practices and there is incessant bickering between networks. Social control is ensured by a mix of fear, suppression, disinformation and propaganda. Russian society is very cynical and dishonest by Western standards. Even the law is so opaque and contradictory that it allows the authorities to convict anyone it wants removed from society. As such, law is more an instrument of oppression than the source of security.
In many ways, the Russian army in Ukraine has offered a reflection of the above. Many soldiers have been unwilling to fight, have deserted, and left their equipment behind. There have been reports of alcohol abuse, lack of discipline, murder and rape of civilians. Events in Bucha provide a prime example. Morale seems to be low too. Perhaps more important is the question of whether young Russian men from the countryside have the education and skills to serve in a modern army. It is clear that the quality of Russian weapons systems is more impressive than that of Russian leadership and human fighting capabilities. Relations between the rank and file are bad, with reportedly a relatively small, weak and notoriously ruthless mid-level of sergeants and lower officers and a bloated higher level of colonels and generals. I have no way of checking this information, but it sounds consonant with what is known of society at large. It would explain the high level of senior officers among the dead. Under fierce Ukrainian resistance, structures of command and authority clearly came apart.
It is hard to predict what the effects of this will be on the Russian political system. If Ukrainian resistance can hold on and the West remains united and determined enough to continue providing modern weapons, the Russian army will be stopped and thrown back. Retreating Russian soldiers will have an impact on Russian society that will be countered by repression by security services and police. The authorities will try (and probably largely fail) to stop information of a severe setback or defeat from filtering through to society. Much like in the aftermath of the Afghanistan conflict, family and friends of the dead and wounded will want those responsible punished. Will those be enough, however to prevent the collapse of the Russian political system or the demise of Vladimir Putin?
It is quite possible that, as Fiona Hill has pointed out, Putin will remain in place and be reduced to the role of a Robert Mugabe or a Bashir al Assad: the leader of a powerless country. Russian weakness would cause the country to turn in on itself for many years. There are several factors, however, that could point in a different direction. A powerful argument that pleads against such a scenario would be the view that many Russians have of the imperial values and mission of their state. Calls for some form of Russian resurrection would be heard. With defeat, officers in the Russian army could try to mount a coup. Oligarchs hit by sanctions could join in. A vocal urban population could provide the local mass support to topple the regime. Even the security services and the police could prove less than loyal. Regime change would seek to restore inner confidence and international prestige. Since social structures are largely absent, this would probably not result in democracy. The immediate search would be on for a new strong man. What that would mean for the strangle hold the present regime has on Russian society is anyone’s guess. It is possible there finally comes a fundamental rethink among the Russian elite of what a sustainable future for the country should be. In a way, the country would find itself back to 1991, with calls for a bigger role of civil society and more openness. It would be a glasnost and perestroika 2.0. Could there be new unrest in Chechnya? What about Georgia and Abkhazia?
Russia’s collapse could have huge consequences for the international scene. In Europe, democracy would be more solidly entrenched in the East. Although destruction and corruption in Ukraine would present problems, the country would probably end up joining both NATO and the EU in the foreseeable future. Hopefully, the war will have forged a Ukrainian identity that, unlike Russia, could offer the cohesion necessary for a mature democracy. The West would have the moral duty to help the country get to its feet again. Let’s hope European politicians finally and truly transcend the provincialism of the past. Poles, Balts, and Fins would be able to sleep more soundly. Elsewhere, European populists would lose an important source of support and money. There would be less trolls and bots on internet. Panslavism and authoritarian ideas would receive severe blows. It would provide for more stability in the former Yugoslav countries and could spell the end of Orbán’s authoritarian regime in Hungary. Russia would probably retreat from the Middle East and leave Armenia to fend for itself, with all the consequences that entails. Turkey’s influence in the Caucasus would grow. Much needed food exports to the Middle East and Africa would be able to resume.
The most important changes, however, would be found in the geopolitical situation of East Asia. Russia’s collapse would leave China as the sole anti-Western superpower. China would almost certainly increase its influence in Central Asia and try to exploit Russia’s weakness to gain a foothold in Siberia. After all, China’s dynamic economy needs raw materials. China also wants to project its power in the Arctic. Paradoxically, the West could find itself supporting the integrity of a weak Russian Federation against the advances of China. India would probably be more firmly in the Western camp than ever, a step it would have taken anyway since the loss of Afghanistan to the aliban, Pakistan’s close ties with China, and India’s need for better weapons against China.